Published March 2007 | Version Submitted
Working Paper Open

Design Improved Parimutuel-type Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Inaccuracies and the Long-Shot Bias as Disequilibrium Phenomena

Abstract

Information Aggregation Mechanisms (IAMs) based on parimutuel-type betting systems can aggregate information from complex environments. However, the performance of previously studied systems leaves something to be desired due to possible bluffing, strategic timing of decisions and a so called long shot bias. This paper demonstrates that two modifications of parimutuel systems improve information aggregation performance by removing disinformation due to strategic behavior and by removing misleading disequilibrium behavior. The experiments also demonstrate that the so called long shot bias results from disequilibrium behavior as opposed to having roots in the psychology of the individuals.

Additional Information

The financial support of the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. The comments of David Grether, Colin Camerer, and Robert Sherman have been very helpful. Published as Axelrod, B.S., Kulick, B.J., Plott, C.R., & Roust, K.A. (2009). The design of improved parimutuel-type information aggregation mechanisms: Inaccuracies and the long-shot bias as disequilibrium phenomena. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 69(2), 170-181.

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Identifiers

Eprint ID
79572
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20170728-164034910

Funding

NSF

Dates

Created
2017-08-01
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Updated
2023-10-26
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Caltech Custom Metadata

Caltech groups
Social Science Working Papers
Series Name
Social Science Working Paper
Series Volume or Issue Number
1268