CaltechAUTHORS
Published December 10, 2015 | Version Submitted
Book Section - Chapter Open

Commitment in First-Price Auctions

Creators

  • 1. ROR icon Singapore University of Technology and Design
  • 2. ROR icon California Institute of Technology

Contributors

Abstract

We study a variation of the single-item sealed-bid first-price auction where one bidder (the leader) is given the option to publicly pre-commit to a distribution from which her bid will be drawn.

Additional Information

© 2015 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg. This research was supported in part by NSF grants CCF-0910940 and CNS-1254169, the Charles Lee Powell Foundation, and a Microsoft Research Faculty Fellowship.

Attached Files

Submitted - commitment.pdf

Files

commitment.pdf

Files (405.7 kB)

Name Size
md5:28d4b44ed8f2fbecf1d4068d5d6b59d5
405.7 kB Preview Download

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
63371
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-48433-3_23
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20160105-095011433

Funding

NSF
CCF-0910940
NSF
CNS-1254169
Charles Lee Powell Foundation
Microsoft Research Faculty Fellowship

Dates

Created
2016-01-05
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-10
Created from EPrint's last_modified field

Caltech Custom Metadata

Series Name
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Series Volume or Issue Number
9347