Published June 1977
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Journal Article
Some new impossibility theorems
Creators
Abstract
Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein [1972] have proved a well-known impossibility theorem for acyclic social preference. They showed that if social preference is acyclic for each configuration of individual preferences, and if the mapping between individual and social preferences satisfies the Pareto axiom, the independence of irrelevant alternatives, and May's positive responsiveness axiom, then there must be an individual i such that for any x and y, xP_iy ⇒ xRy. This individual might be considered a "vetoer."
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© 1977 Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.External Files
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- 82853
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- CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-145356732
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- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171027-142652603 (URL)
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2017-11-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field