Published June 1977 | Version Campus-Access Only
Journal Article

Some new impossibility theorems

Abstract

Mas-Colell and Sonnenschein [1972] have proved a well-known impossibility theorem for acyclic social preference. They showed that if social preference is acyclic for each configuration of individual preferences, and if the mapping between individual and social preferences satisfies the Pareto axiom, the independence of irrelevant alternatives, and May's positive responsiveness axiom, then there must be an individual i such that for any x and y, xP_iy ⇒ xRy. This individual might be considered a "vetoer."

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© 1977 Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

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Eprint ID
82853
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20171101-145356732

Dates

Created
2017-11-01
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Updated
2021-11-15
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