Published 2007 | Version public
Book Section - Chapter

On the Importance of Causal Taxonomy

Abstract

Using a standard counterexample to probabilistic theories of causation as an illustration, this chapter argues that there are a number of questions which one might ask about a putative causal relationship: Is it causal at all? What is the direction of the relationship? What is its strength? How does the cause compare with various alternatives? How stable is it under changes in background conditions? What are the pathways responsible for it? Many approaches in philosophy and psychology run these questions together. Together, the answers to these questions can provide a taxonomy of different kinds of causal relationships. By keeping these questions separately, we are able to clarify both philosophical applications of causation, and psychological claims about causal learning.

Additional Information

© 2007 Oxford University Press. For helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Clark Glymour, Alison Gopnik, Steve Sloman, Jim Woodward, and the participants in the workshop of causal learning and theory formation held at the Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University.

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Eprint ID
44720
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20140407-163846961

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Created
2014-04-14
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Updated
2019-10-03
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