Published April 2005
| Version public
Journal Article
Allocation rules for network games
Abstract
Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.
Additional Information
© 2004 Elsevier Inc. Received 4 June 2003; Available online 12 October 2004. I thank Jernej Copic, Sergio Currarini, Gabrielle Demange, Bhaskar Dutta, Cheng-Zhong Qin, Sudipta Sarangi, Anne van de Nouweland, and Eyal Winter for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees whose detailed suggestions have improved the exposition, and for Financial support from the Lee Center for Advanced Networking. Formerly SSWP 1160.Additional details
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 82965
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171103-162601118
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170801-162757854 (URL)
Funding
- Caltech Lee Center for Advanced Networking
Dates
- Created
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2017-11-06Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2021-11-15Created from EPrint's last_modified field