Published May 2009
| Version Submitted
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The Testable Implications of Zero-sum Games
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Abstract
We study Nash-rationalizable joint choice behavior under restriction on zero- sum games. We show that interchangeability of choice behavior is the only additional condition which distinguishes zero-sum games from general non-cooperative games with respect to testable implications. This observation implies that in some sense interchangeability is not only a necessary but also a sufficient property which differentiates zero-sum games.
Additional Information
I am grateful to Christopher Chambers and Federico Echenique for encouraging and guiding me in working on this paper. I am also thankful to Ruth Mendel and Luke Boosey for corrections and neatly reorganizing the proofs. Published as Lee, S. (2012). The testable implications of zero-sum games. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 48(1), 39-46.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1303.pdf
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sswp1303.pdf
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- Eprint ID
- 79503
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170727-143423913
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20120221-145901876 (URL)
Dates
- Created
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2017-08-02Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
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- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1303