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Published January 1993 | Version Published
Journal Article Open

Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining

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Abstract

A persistently troubling question in the legal-economic literature is why cases proceed to trial. Litigation is a negative-sum proposition for the litigants-the longer the process continues, the lower their aggregate wealth. Although civil litigation is resolved by settlement in an estimated 95 percent of all disputes, what accounts for the failure of the remaining 5 percent to settle prior to trial?

Additional Information

© 1993 University of Chicago. We thank Douglas Laycock for his helpful comments. Jodi Gillis, Na-than Johnson, Ruth Silverman, and Arlene Simon provided valuable research assistance. Loewenstein's research was supported by the Russell Sage Foundation. Issacharoff's research was assisted by funding from the members of the Dean's Roundtable at the University of Texas School of Law and by the Shell Oil Foundation. Camerer's research was supported by the National Science Foundation, Grant SES 90-23531.

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22133
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CaltechAUTHORS:20110211-102547293

Related works

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http://www.jstor.org/stable/3085636 (URL)

Funding

Russell Sage Foundation
University of Texas School of Law
Shell Oil Foundation
NSF
SES 90-23531

Dates

Created
2011-03-10
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Updated
2019-10-03
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