Published January 2014 | Version public
Journal Article

The Speed of Information Revelation and Eventual Price Quality in Markets with Insiders: Comparing Two Theories

Abstract

Two theoretical literatures, one using Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE), and the other using noisy rational expectations equilibrium (NREE), both provide a foundation for understanding how private information is impounded into asset prices, yet some of their predictions are conflicting. Here, we compare for the first time, the two theories using data from carefully controlled laboratory asset markets. In the dynamics, we find strong evidence for BNE theory, although final prices support predictions of the NREE theory. Finally, we document that price volatility increases when information is being impounded in prices.

Additional Information

© 2013 The Authors. Published by Oxford University Press [on behalf of the European Finance Association]. Comments from Craig Holden and Avanidhar Subrahmanyam on an earlier draft, as well as discussions with Charles Plott and Sera Linardi are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. Research supported by NSF grants DRU-0527491 and SES 0616431.

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
44843
DOI
10.1093/rof/rfs049
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20140410-090653513

Related works

Describes
10.1093/rof/rfs049 (DOI)

Funding

NSF
DRU-0527491
NSF
SES 0616431

Dates

Created
2014-04-10
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-10
Created from EPrint's last_modified field