CaltechAUTHORS
Published May 2004 | Version Published
Book Section - Chapter Open

Experimental Study of Market Reputation Mechanisms

Creators

  • 1. ROR icon Hewlett-Packard (United States)
  • 2. ROR icon California Institute of Technology

Abstract

We experimentally compare low-information, high-information and self-reporting reputation mechanisms. The results indicate players strategically reacted to the reputation mechanisms, with higher information mechanisms increasing market efficiency.

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Eprint ID
69801
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20160819-161905457

Dates

Created
2016-08-22
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Updated
2021-11-11
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