CaltechAUTHORS
Published March 2012 | Version public
Journal Article Metadata-only

Unconditional Security From Noisy Quantum Storage

Creators

  • 1. ROR icon California Institute of Technology
  • 2. ROR icon IBM Research - Thomas J. Watson Research Center
  • 3. ROR icon Centre for Quantum Technologies
  • 4. ROR icon University of Bristol

Abstract

We consider the implementation of two-party cryptographic primitives based on the sole assumption that no large-scale reliable quantum storage is available to the cheating party. We construct novel protocols for oblivious transfer and bit commitment, and prove that realistic noise levels provide security even against the most general attack. Such unconditional results were previously only known in the so-called bounded-storage model which is a special case of our setting. Our protocols can be implemented with present-day hardware used for quantum key distribution. In particular, no quantum storage is required for the honest parties.

Additional Information

© 2011 IEEE. Manuscript received July 19, 2010; revised May 24, 2011; accepted May 31, 2011. Date of current version February 29, 2012. We thank Marcos Curty, Andrew Doherty, Amir Kalev, Hoi- Kwong Lo, Oded Regev, John Preskill and Barbara Terhal for interesting discussions. We also thank Christian Schaffner for discussions and comments on an earlier draft, and Dominique Unruh for pointing out a flaw in the proof of Theorem 3.5 in an earlier version of the paper, as well as for various other useful suggestions.

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
29838
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20120326-090604080

Dates

Created
2012-04-17
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-09
Created from EPrint's last_modified field

Caltech Custom Metadata

Other Numbering System Name
INSPEC Accession Number
Other Numbering System Identifier
12557635