Published 1995
| Version public
Book Section - Chapter
The Holdout Game: An Experimental Study of an Infinitely Repeated Game with Two-Sided Incomplete Information
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Contributors
Abstract
This paper investigates a two-person infinitely repeated game of incomplete information in which both players have private information on their individual type before the first game is played; this initial private information is followed by an infinite sequence if identical simultaneous-move stage games. Players observe their own payoff and the other player's move after each stage game has been played. Payoffs in the game are given by the discounted sum of payoffs in all the stage games.
Additional Information
© 1995 Cambridge University Press. This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation grant no. SES-9011828 to the California Institute of Technology. We wish to thank Michael Fey, Daniel Kim, Janice Lau, Jessie McReynolds, and Jeff Prisbrey for research assistance. Comments by participants in the June 1992 meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare (Caen, France) are gratefully acknowledged. The data for the experiment are available from the authors on request.Additional details
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- Eprint ID
- 65195
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-113638069
Related works
- Describes
- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170829-134803360 (URL)
Funding
- NSF
- SES-9011828
Dates
- Created
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2016-03-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-11-22Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- International Symposia in Economic Theory and Econometrics
- Other Numbering System Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Other Numbering System Identifier
- 804