CaltechAUTHORS
Published November 2002 | Version public
Journal Article Metadata-only

Federal Mandates with Local Agenda Setters

Creators

  • 1. ROR icon California Institute of Technology

Abstract

This paper investigates the effect of local monopoly agenda setting on federal standards. Federal standards specify a minimum (or maximum) point in policy space which can be raised (or lowered) by local option. Without local agenda setters, this creates incentives for nonmajoritarian outcomes, with a tendency for policies to be too high (low). Local agenda setters may have incentives to distort these outcomes even further. We demonstrate that federal standards can counterbalance the distortions of local agenda setters.

Additional Information

© 2002 Springer. We wish to thank LEESP, CNRS, and NSF for financial support. The paper has benefitted from helpful comments by Andy Postlewaite, Howard Rosenthal, Norman Schofield, and an anonymous referee.

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
65192
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-103936514

Funding

Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
NSF

Dates

Created
2016-03-17
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-10
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