Published November 2003
| Version Submitted
Working Paper
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A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets
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Abstract
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.
Additional Information
We thank John Duggan for several useful discussions. Part of this paper was written during a visit to the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, in Uruguay. Published as Echenique, F. and Oviedo, J. (2006) A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. Theoretical Economics, 1(2):233-273.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp1185.pdf
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sswp1185.pdf
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- Eprint ID
- 79630
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-153916899
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- http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:ECHte06 (URL)
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- Created
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2017-08-01Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-11-26Created from EPrint's last_modified field
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- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 1185