Published December 2002 | Version Published
Journal Article Open

The Development of Intermediation in French Credit Markets: Evidence from the Estates of Burgundy

  • 1. ROR icon University of Wyoming
  • 2. ROR icon University of California, Los Angeles

Abstract

We document how intermediaries shaped markets or, conversely, how market institutions constrained intermediaries. In Dijon, where the Estates of Burgundy's debt amounted to nearly half of all bonds in that small market, there was limited need for intermediaries. In the 1740s the borrowing needs of the province expanded, and the estates began to borrow in Paris, where their debt remained a small fraction of the market, and where they relied on notaries to place their bonds and to create a secondary market. These developments assured the estates' capacity to borrow and thus Burgundian autonomy from the French Crown.

Additional Information

© 2002 Economic History Association. The authors would like to thank Stephen Haber, Thomas Hubbard, Naomi Lamoreaux, and Philip Leslie for comments on a previous draft. Rosenthal gratefully acknowledges the support provided by grants from the National Science Foundation (SES 9022192) and the RBSL Bergman Foundation.

Attached Files

Published - the_development_of_intermediation.pdf

Files

the_development_of_intermediation.pdf

Files (706.7 kB)

Name Size
md5:aa3fb733b4f6c3300cce361481b7631c
706.7 kB Preview Download

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
65206
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20160308-132937651

Related works

Funding

NSF
SES 9022192
RBSL Bergman Foundation

Dates

Created
2016-03-14
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-10
Created from EPrint's last_modified field