Published November 1973
| Version Published
Journal Article
Open
Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice
Creators
Abstract
The paper provides several axiomatizations of the concept of "path independence" as applied to choice functions defined over finite sets. The axioms are discussed in terms of their relationship to "rationality" postulates and their meaning with respect to social choice models.
Additional Information
Originally appeared as Social Science Working Paper 2, entitled "Social Choice and Social Rationality". The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support supplied by National Science Foundation Grant GS36214 and Resources for the Future. In addition, he wishes to thank Robert P. Parks who found an error in the proof of Theorem 3 in an early draft, and also A. K. Sen and Joel Franklin who provided useful comments. Of course, responsibility for error remains with the author.Attached Files
Published - plott-econometrica-41-6.pdf
Files
plott-econometrica-41-6.pdf
Additional details
Additional titles
- Alternative title
- Social Choice and Social Rationality
Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 20193
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20100928-112320283
Related works
- Describes
- http://www.jstor.org/stable/1914037 (URL)
Funding
- NSF
- GS36214
- Resources for the Future
Dates
- Created
-
2010-09-28Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
-
2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Caltech groups
- Social Science Working Papers
- Other Numbering System Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Other Numbering System Identifier
- 2