CaltechAUTHORS
Published April 2011 | Version public
Journal Article Metadata-only

Incentive effects: The case of belief elicitation from individuals in groups

Creators

  • 1. ROR icon California Institute of Technology

Abstract

Non-incentivized belief elicitation has a negative effect on the belief accuracy of experienced observers predicting choices in 2 × 2 matrix games. This negative impact extends to the accuracy of group beliefs and revised beliefs after forecasters know each other's initial beliefs.

Additional Information

© 2010 Elsevier B.V. Received 7 September 2009; revised 18 November 2010; Accepted 24 November 2010. Available online 4 December 2010. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of The Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science. I thank Roland Benabou, Stephen Morris, Thomas Palfrey, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments.

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
27266
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2010.11.045
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20111018-081333167

Funding

Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science

Dates

Created
2011-10-18
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-09
Created from EPrint's last_modified field