Published December 2016 | Version Supplemental Material
Journal Article Open

Expressive and Strategic Behavior in Legislative Elections in Argentina

  • 1. ROR icon California Institute of Technology

Abstract

In this paper I study strategic voting behavior in the Argentine Senate election for the City of Buenos Aires in 2013. I estimate and analyze the voter transition matrix between the primary and general elections using a Bayesian hierarchical model for ecological inference, utilizing a rich data set of ballot box data. The results show that strategic behavior is not widespread among the electorate in Buenos Aires. In particular, at least 75 % of voters who had the opportunity to avoid vote wasting by behaving strategically did not. I also find high levels of vote wasting when analyzing other provinces during the same election cycle. These results suggest that these electorates might be composed of a mixture of voters with strategic and expressive motivations, where the expressive factions dominate.

Additional Information

© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media New York. First Online: 21 April 2016.

Attached Files

Supplemental Material - 11109_2016_9340_MOESM1_ESM.pdf

Files

11109_2016_9340_MOESM1_ESM.pdf

Files (164.7 kB)

Name Size
md5:3fa7c351f7ac3fa68b9daccdd9aacc3a
164.7 kB Preview Download

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
71868
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20161109-084022061

Dates

Created
2016-11-09
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-11
Created from EPrint's last_modified field