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Published March 12, 2022 | Version Submitted
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Efficiency in Random Resource Allocation and Social Choice

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Abstract

We study efficiency in general collective choice problems when agents have ordinal preferences and randomization is allowed. We establish the equivalence between welfare maximization and ex-ante efficiency for general domains. We relate ex-ante efficiency with ex-post efficiency, characterizing when the two notions coincide. Our results have implications for well-studied mechanisms including random serial dictatorship and a number of specific environments, including the dichotomous, single-peaked, and social choice domains.

Additional Information

We are grateful to (in alphabetic order) Anna Bogomolnaia, Ron Holzman, Hervé Moulin, Luciano Pomatto, and Omer Tamuz for discussions that inspired this work, and the Linde Institute at Caltech for its financial support. Federico Echenique thanks the National Science Foundation for its support through the grants SES 1558757 and CNS 1518941. Joseph Root was partially supported by PIMCO. Fedor Sandomirskiy was partially supported by the National Science Foundation (grant CNS 1518941) and the HSE University Basic Research Program.

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Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
115382
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20220707-170628097

Related works

Describes
10.48550/arXiv.2203.06353 (DOI)

Funding

Linde Institute of Economic and Management Science
NSF
SES-1558757
NSF
CNS-1518941
PIMCO
HSE University

Dates

Created
2022-07-08
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2023-06-02
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