Published November 1988 | Version public
Journal Article

The analysis of committee power: An application to senate voting on the minimum wage

Abstract

The disproportionate influence of standing committees on congressional outcomes is an often-noted empirical regularity in American politics, and a large body of theoretical and empirical research has sought to identify the determinants of "committee influence," "committee power," or "deference to committees." This paper does not attempt to resolve issues of when and why committee power exists. Rather, it focuses on a prerequisite to the resolution of such issues: How can committee power be assessed empirically?

Additional Information

The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments of Robert Flanagan and Peter Reiss and the research support from National Science Foundation grant 23-638973. Formerly SSWP 641.

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
83123
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20171109-165752482

Funding

NSF
SES-23638973

Dates

Created
2017-11-16
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-15
Created from EPrint's last_modified field