CaltechAUTHORS
Published February 2015 | Version Submitted + Published
Journal Article Open

The Core Matchings of Markets with Transfers

Creators

  • 1. ROR icon University of California, San Diego
  • 2. ROR icon California Institute of Technology

Abstract

We characterize the structure of the set of core matchings of an assignment game (a two-sided market with transfers). Such a set satisfies a property we call consistency. Consistency of a set of matchings states that, for any matching v, if, for each agent i there exists a matching μ in the set for which μ(i) = v(i), then v is in the set. A set of matchings satisfies consistency if and only if there is an assignment game for which all elements of the set maximize the surplus.

Additional Information

© 2015 American Economic Association. We are grateful to Kim Border for explaining the integer/real version of Farkas' Lemma, and to Haluk Ergin for his detailed comments. We also thank Guilherme de Freitas and Sang Mok Lee for excellent research assistance, and two anonymous referees for advice on revising our paper for the journal. Our research was supported by the National Science Foundation through grant SES-0751980.

Attached Files

Published - mic.20130089.pdf

Submitted - assignment.pdf

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Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
20355
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20101008-104911510

Related works

Describes
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20160321-141503758 (URL)

Funding

NSF
SES-0751980

Dates

Created
2010-10-08
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-08
Created from EPrint's last_modified field

Caltech Custom Metadata

Other Numbering System Name
Social Science Working Paper
Other Numbering System Identifier
1298