CaltechAUTHORS
Published May 2016 | Version public
Journal Article Metadata-only

Optimal robust bilateral trade: Risk neutrality

Creators

  • 1. ROR icon University of California, Los Angeles
  • 2. ROR icon California Institute of Technology
  • 3. ROR icon University of St Andrews

Abstract

A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices.

Additional Information

© 2015 Elsevier. Received 11 February 2008, Accepted 28 November 2015, Available online 29 December 2015. This paper was formerly a part of our paper titled "Ex-Post Constrained-Efficient Bilateral Trade with Risk-Averse Traders" (Copic and Ponsatí, 2008a), the part presented here addresses the case of risk neutrality. We are grateful to Chris Helwig, three anonymous referees and to Emily and Melinda Wang for their typesetting assistance. Čopič is grateful to the Economics Faculty at the University of Ljubljana for their hospitality during Winter 2015.

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
67587
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20160602-145803089

Dates

Created
2016-06-02
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-11
Created from EPrint's last_modified field