Published May 2003 | Version Published
Journal Article Open

Models of thinking, learning, and teaching in games

  • 1. ROR icon California Institute of Technology
  • 2. ROR icon University of California, Berkeley
  • 3. ROR icon National University of Singapore

Abstract

Noncooperative game theory combines strategic thinking, best-response, and mutual consistency of beliefs and choices (equilibrium). Hundreds of experiments show that in actual behavior these three forces are limited, even when subjects are highly motivated and analytically skilled (Camerer, 2003). The challenge is to create models that are as general, precise, and parsimonious as equilibrium, but which also use cognitive details to explain experimental evidence more accurately and to predict new regularities. This paper describes three exemplar models of behavior in one-shot games (thinking), learning over time, and how repeated "partner" matching affects behavior (teaching) (see Camerer et al., 2002b).

Additional Information

© American Economic Association 2003. Discussants: C. Mónica Capra, Washington and Lee University; Colin Camerer, Caltech; David Cooper, Case Western Reserve University.

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Identifiers

Eprint ID
11373
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:CAMae03

Funding

NSF
SES-0078911

Dates

Created
2008-08-14
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Updated
2021-11-08
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