Published September 1988
| Version Published
Journal Article
Open
Plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion
Creators
Abstract
A model of plea bargaining with asymmetric information is presented. The prosecutor's private information is the strength of the case; the defendant's is his guilt or innocence. In equilibrium, some cases are dismissed because they are too likely to involve an innocent defendant. In the remaining cases, the prosecutor's sentence offer reveals the strength of the case. A particular restriction on prosecutorial discretion is shown to be welfare-enhancing for some parameter configurations.
Additional Information
© 1988 American Economic Association. I would like to thank Kim Border, Richard Craswell, Ted Groves, Barry Nalebuff, Herman Quirmbach, Eric Rasmusen, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussion. The financial support of the National Science Foundation, grant no. SES-8710578, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago are gratefully acknowledged. Formerly SSWP 616.Attached Files
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Identifiers
- Eprint ID
- 83132
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20171110-150912004
Related works
Funding
- NSF
- SES-8710578
- Alfred P. Sloan Foundation
- University of Chicago Graduate School of Business
Dates
- Created
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2017-11-16Created from EPrint's datestamp field
- Updated
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field