CaltechAUTHORS
Published October 2017 | Version public
Book Section - Chapter Metadata-only

Networked Cournot Competition in Platform Markets

Creators

  • 1. ROR icon Cornell University
  • 2. ROR icon California Institute of Technology

Abstract

Unlike traditional firms, platforms do not manufacture products. Instead, they arrange matches between firms and consumers, facilitating a safe and simple trading process, providing value for all parties involved. Among the many design considerations for platforms is the trade-off between transparency and search costs. In this talk, we discuss the impact of transparency and search on the economic efficiency of platforms.

Additional Information

© 2017 IEEE. Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 18 January 2018. This work has received support from the NSF through AitF-1637598, CNS-1518941, CPS-154471, ECCS-1351621, and IIP-1632124. The collaboration began while the authors were visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing.

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
84526
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20180125-133803270

Funding

NSF
CCF-1637598
NSF
CNS-1518941
NSF
CPS-154471
NSF
ECCS-1351621
NSF
IIP-1632124

Dates

Created
2018-01-31
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-15
Created from EPrint's last_modified field