CaltechAUTHORS
Published May 2017 | Version Accepted Version
Journal Article Open

Stability and auctions in labor markets with job security

Creators

  • 1. ROR icon University of British Columbia
  • 2. ROR icon Cornell University
  • 3. ROR icon Technion – Israel Institute of Technology

Abstract

Fu et al. (2016) introduced a stability concept for labor markets with job security. We show that their proposed outcomes form Nash equilibria of an auction where firms compete for workers. This parallels literature on stable outcomes and similar auctions, and yields new price of anarchy bounds.

Additional Information

© 2017 Elsevier B.V. Received 29 October 2016. Received in revised form 6 February 2017. Accepted 17 February 2017. Available online 20 February 2017. The third author's research was supported by a Marie-Curie IOF fellowship grant ADVANCE-AGT 330240. Smorodinsky gratefully acknowledges the support of ISF grant 2016301, the joint Microsoft-Technion e-Commerce Lab, Technion VPR grants, the Bernard M. Gordon Center for Systems Engineering at the Technion and the Technion Autonomous System Program at the Technion.

Attached Files

Accepted Version - SPIB-V4.pdf

Files

SPIB-V4.pdf

Files (286.6 kB)

Name Size
md5:14ce3f6d1cbcb46721413e6191e59cdd
286.6 kB Preview Download

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
77551
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20170518-080939719

Funding

Marie Curie Fellowship
ADVANCE-AGT 330240
Israel Science Foundation
2016301
Microsoft-Technion e-Commerce Lab
Technion

Dates

Created
2017-05-18
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2021-11-15
Created from EPrint's last_modified field