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Published January 1984 | Version Published
Journal Article Open

Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information

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Abstract

Recent work in game theory has shown that, in principle, it may be possible for firms in an industry to form a self-policing cartel to maximize their joint profits. This paper examines the nature of cartel self-enforcement in the presence of demand uncertainty. A model of a noncooperatively supported cartel is presented, and the aspects of industry structure which would make such a cartel viable are discussed.

Additional Information

© 1984 The Econometric Society. We have accepted the generous help of many colleagues in the course of this research. We would particularly like to thank C. Berry, T. Bresnahan, J. Friedman, J. Mirrlees, S. Salop, H. Sonnenschein, and R. Willig. Robert Porter's research received support from a Sloan Foundation grant to the University of Minnesota Economics Department. Formerly SSWP 367.

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Eprint ID
83298
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20171117-140712553

Related works

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http://www.jstor.org/stable/1911462 (URL)
http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20171006-135046763 (URL)

Funding

Alfred P. Sloan Foundation

Dates

Created
2017-11-17
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Updated
2021-11-15
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