Published November 1985
| Version Submitted
Discussion Paper
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Responsibility, Liability, and Incentive Compatibility
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Abstract
In this paper I ask what should be the assignment of liability for risks of toxic chemicals, and more generally. I develop a theory of liability, based on two principles. The first is responsibility as own-cost-bearing and is justified on the grounds of fairness. The second is efficiency and is justified on the grounds of welfare. These two principles provide a joint foundation to the theory of incentive compatibility, which is an important consideration in the design of liability systems.
Additional Information
I wish to thank Brian Barry, Alan Donagan, John Gillroy, Daniel Hausman, Leo llurwicz, Will Jones, Arthur Kuflik, Bart Schultz, Alan Schwartz, Alan Strudler and Steve Walt for many helpful comments. Published as Page, Talbot. "Responsibility, liability, and incentive compatibility." Ethics 97.1 (1986): 240-262.Attached Files
Submitted - sswp590.pdf
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sswp590.pdf
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- Eprint ID
- 81455
- Resolver ID
- CaltechAUTHORS:20170914-142446945
Dates
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2017-09-15Created from EPrint's datestamp field
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2019-10-03Created from EPrint's last_modified field
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- Social Science Working Papers
- Series Name
- Social Science Working Paper
- Series Volume or Issue Number
- 590