Impossibility of adversarial self-testing and secure sampling
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1.
Virginia Tech
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2.
California Institute of Technology
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Télécom ParisTech
Abstract
Self-testing is the task where spatially separated Alice and Bob cooperate to deduce the inner workings of untrusted quantum devices by interacting with them in a classical manner. We examine the task above where Alice and Bob do not trust each other which we call adversarial self-testing. We show that adversarial self-testing implies secure sampling—a simpler task that we introduce where distrustful Alice and Bob wish to sample from a joint probability distribution with the guarantee that an honest party's marginal is not biased. By extending impossibility results in two-party quantum cryptography, we give a simple proof that both of these tasks are impossible in all but trivial settings. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
Copyright and License
Published by the American Physical Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license. Further distribution of this work must maintain attribution to the author(s) and the published article's title, journal citation, and DOI.
Acknowledgement
We are thankful to J. Bartusek for helpful discussions. A.B. is partially supported by a Bitshares Fellowship. A.S.A. acknowledges support from IQIM, an NSF Physics Frontier Center (GBMF-1250002), MURI Grant No. FA9550-18-1-0161, and the US Department of Defense through a QuICS Hartree Fellowship. Part of the work was carried out while A.S.A. was visiting the Simons Institute for the Theory of Computing. T.V.H. acknowledges support from ParisRegionQCI, supported by Paris Region; FranceQCI, supported by the European Commission, under the Digital Europe program; and QSNP: European Union’s Horizon Europe research and innovation program under the project “Quantum Security Networks Partnership.” J.S. is partially supported by Commonwealth Cyber Initiative SWVA Grant No. 467489 and by Virginia Tech’s Open Access Subvention Fund.
Files
PhysRevResearch.6.L032039.pdf
Additional details
Funding
- Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation
- 1250002
- Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative
- FA9550-18-1-0161
- United States Department of Defense
- European Commission
- Commonwealth Cyber Initiative
- 467489
- Virginia Tech
Dates
- Accepted
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2024-07-09Accepted
- Available
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2024-08-21Published online
Caltech Custom Metadata
- Publication Status
- Published