Published 1993 | Version Published
Book Section - Chapter Open

Information, fairness, and efficiency in bargaining

Abstract

Economic theory assumes people strive for efficient agreements that benefit all consenting parties. The frequency of mutually destructive conflicts such as strikes, litigation, and military conflict, therefore, poses an important challenge to the field.

Additional Information

© 1993 Cambridge University Press. We thank Maya Bar-Hillel, Jon Baron, Max Bazerman, Robin Keller, and Barbara Mellers for helpful comments NSF grant SES 90-23531 provided support to the first author.

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Eprint ID
22374
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20110218-092509805

Funding

NSF
SES 90-23531

Dates

Created
2011-03-09
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Updated
2019-10-03
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