Published November 2020 | Version public
Journal Article

Fake News, Information Herds, Cascades, and Economic Knowledge

  • 1. ROR icon California Institute of Technology

Abstract

This article focuses on principles of information aggregation in the presence of false, public reports (fake news). The analysis explores news has been having a public goods feature characterized by models of information and economic efficiency. The analysis is not tied to any particular theory about how or why unreliable news emerges. The reports could be purposeful deception, intentions to mislead or profit motivated responses to decision biases of readers. A well-known and widely studied "cascade" experiment is used to illustrate principles that provide links to standard economic models. News is modeled as an aggregation of a simple, fixed chain of decentralized observations and reports about an underlying, unknown state of nature. The personal value of an individual's decision depends on both the decision and the underlying state of nature. The information about the state used in the decision can reflect private observations or the "news" about the decisions of others. The experiments demonstrate that aggregated information is dependent on accumulated trust in news sources and has value as a special form of public goods.

Additional Information

© 2020 SAGE Publications. Article first published online: October 14, 2020; Issue published: November 1, 2020. The insights of David Grether and the help of B. Atsavapranee, are gratefully acknowledged. All experimental programs were designed by Travis Maron. The financial support of the John Templeton Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

Additional details

Identifiers

Eprint ID
113343
Resolver ID
CaltechAUTHORS:20220209-296325000

Funding

John Templeton Foundation
58067

Dates

Created
2022-02-09
Created from EPrint's datestamp field
Updated
2022-02-09
Created from EPrint's last_modified field